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We propose that self-affirmation may endow people more psychological resources to
buffer against the negative influence of rejecting unfair offers in the classic ultimatum
game (UG) and further lead to a stronger tendency to reject those offers. We tested
this possibility by conducting an event-related potential (ERP) study about the UG,
with the ERP component P3 as an indirect indicator of psychological resources.
Participants were randomly assigned to the affirmation or control condition and then
completed the UG through electrophysiological recording. As expected, the behavioral
data indicated that compared with unaffirmed ones, affirmed participants were more
likely to reject unfair UG offers; the electrophysiological data indicated that compared
to the unaffirmed, affirmed participants showed a greater P3 in response to the
presentation of an offer. These findings suggest that psychological resources may play
a role in rejecting others beyond the fairness concern, and additionally shed light on the
neural mechanisms underlying self-affirmation.
Keywords: self-affirmation, social decision-making, ultimatum game, fairness, social rejection, event-related
potential, P3
INTRODUCTION
Social decision-making refers to the act of making decisions in which more than one person is
involved. In social decision-making, people concern not only with self-interest but also with the
interests of others (Gintis et al., 2003; Ruff and Fehr, 2014). As a result, social decisions in real life
may not be consistent with the classic economic principle that people try their best to maximize
their personal earnings (Ruff and Fehr, 2014). Indeed, this is the case in the ultimatum game (UG),
an important paradigm of social decision-making (Güth et al., 1982, 2001). A typical UG involves
two players, including a proposer and a responder. The proposer decides how to split an amount
of money between the proposer and responder, and the responder chooses either to accept the
offer (the money is divided accordingly) or to reject it (neither player receives anything). Deviating
from the principle of reward maximization, an established finding shows that responders are prone
to decline offers of less than 30% of the total sum (Thaler, 1988; Güth and Tietz, 1990; Nowak
et al., 2000). Given the adage that “something is better than nothing,” why do people tend to reject
offers in such a circumstance? This issue has fascinated researchers for decades. The dominant
theory proposes that perceived unfairness leads to the rejection of an offer (Fehr and Gachter,
2002). According to this theory, the primary motivation for UG responders to reject an inequitable
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offer is to punish those who treat them unfairly, thereby enforcing
a fair social norm even when the punishment also results in a
personal cost (i.e., altruistic punishment; see Gintis et al., 2003;
Stallen and Sanfey, 2013). This fairness account is thought to
have important evolutionary significance because it promotes
cooperation and inhibits selfish behavior (Nowak, 2006).
What concerns us in this research is not the motivation that
drives UG rejection. Instead, our focus is the sine qua non for
following through with the rejection, which, to our knowledge,
is an issue that previous literature has largely neglected. It is
well established that making decisions consumes psychological
resources (e.g., Pocheptsova et al., 2009; Vohs et al., 2009; Polman
and Vohs, 2016). This is particularly true in the rejection of
others. In a UG context, rejecting a person’s offer not only means
economic loss; more importantly, it invites psychological costs
as well. For instance, research shows that rejecting someone
causes anxiety and social pain (Zhou et al., 2009), and similarly,
ostracizing a person depletes psychological resources (Ciarocco
et al., 2001). Indeed, existing theories have documented the need
for affiliation as a fundamental motivation for human beings
(Maslow, 1968; Baumeister and Leary, 1995). These theories
and findings suggest that accepting an unfair offer does not
necessarily reflect an economically rational decision to pursue
benefit maximization, as suggested by classic economic principles
(e.g., Haselhuhn and Mellers, 2005). Rather, such a response
might simply be the result of insufficient psychological resources
to bear the negative effects of rejecting another person. Inversely
put, if a responder possesses enough psychological resources or
his/her psychological resources are momentarily strengthened,
he/she will be more likely to reject an unfair offer. As far as
we know, this hypothesis has not been empirically tested. To
fill this gap, we conducted a study to examine the influences
of self-affirmation on social decision-making during the UG.
We expected that self-affirmation would endow people more
psychological resources and consequently increase the tendency
of rejecting an unfair offer.
Self-affirmation refers to an act that may demonstrate self-
adequacy and further affirm a sense of self-integrity (Steele, 1988;
Cohen and Sherman, 2014). A typical operationalization of self-
affirmation involves people writing about their core personal
values and elaborating on why those values are important to
them. By doing so, people can restore extensive psychological
resources to cope with stressful problems in a positive and
approaching way rather than in a passive and avoiding way
(Koole et al., 1999; McQueen and Klein, 2006; Sherman and
Hartson, 2010; Cohen and Sherman, 2014). Numerous studies
have documented the adaptive function of self-affirmation, such
as buffering against various threats, stresses, and life difficulties in
diverse domains and cultures (for reviews, Sherman and Cohen,
2006; Cohen and Sherman, 2014). In particular, self-affirmation
counteracts self-depletion (Schmeichel and Vohs, 2009). Our
previous research showed that self-affirmation functions similarly
in China as it does in the West (Cai et al., 2013). Unlike in
the West, the operative component in China is the affirmation
of a familial self (writing about core values shared by oneself
and his/her family) rather than the individual self (writing about
personal core values; Cai et al., 2013).
In this study, we asked Chinese participants to affirm their
familial self or not and then to complete a trial-by-trial UG
task. China is a representative culture of collectivism, where
interpersonal harmony is highly valued (Markus and Kitayama,
1991; Zhang et al., 2005). As a result, rejecting a person would
be particularly difficult and entails substantial psychological
resources (Pöhlmann et al., 2007), which makes China an ideal
place to test our hypotheses. We infer that self-affirmation would
momentarily equip people with more psychological resources
and ultimately make Chinese participants more likely to reject an
unfair offer. To test this behavioral impact of self-affirmation, we
used the rejection rate of UG offers as an index. We predicted
that the rejection rate of unfair offers in the self-affirmation
condition would be higher than the control condition; for fair
offers, however, we expected no significant difference in rejection
rate because there is no motivation for people to reject a fair offer.
To support our psychological resource account in explaining
the rejection of unfair offers, we need to demonstrate that self-
affirmation would endow people more psychological resources
momentarily. Since there is no direct behavioral measurement
of psychological resources (Sherman, 2013), we relied on the
event-related potentials (ERP) instead. In UG studies, two ERP
components are frequently used: the feedback-related negativity
(FRN) and P3 (Boksem and De Cremer, 2010; Luo et al.,
2014). The FRN is a fronto-central negativity that peaks at
approximately 200–300 ms post-onset of outcome feedback
(Gehring and Willoughby, 2002). In non-social decision-making
tasks, the FRN automatically encodes the economic value of an
event, such that monetary losses elicit a larger FRN than gains
(San Martín, 2012, for a review). Similarly, in social decision-
making tasks such as the UG, an unfair offer elicits a larger FRN
than a fair offer (Boksem and De Cremer, 2010; Van der Veen and
Sahibdin, 2011; Alexopoulos et al., 2012). In this sense, the FRN
is considered to be an automatic monitor of fairness (Luo et al.,
2014). Following the FRN, the P3 is a centro-parietal positivity
appearing in the 300–600 ms time window, which also plays
an important role in outcome evaluation (San Martín, 2012).
Specifically, the P3 amplitude represents the extent to which
cognitive resources are involved in outcome evaluation; a larger
P3 indicates more cognitive resources such as attentional and
execute control resources are allocated to the current scenario
(Kok, 1997; Utku et al., 2002; Polich, 2007). Indeed, numerous
studies have shown that in performing a task, the more cognitive
resources are implicated, the larger P3 component will be
observed (Olofsson et al., 2008; Polezzi et al., 2010). In this study,
we suggest that the P3 could be regarded as an indirect indicator
of psychological resources. When psychological resources are
depleted, people would be more likely to make decisions based on
gut feelings (Levav et al., 2010), thereby minimizing the cognitive
resources needed in outcome evaluation; in this case, a smaller P3
would be expected. Inversely put, when psychological resources
are momentarily increased, people would invest more cognitive
resources and make more thoughtful decisions (Tice et al., 2007;
Wang et al., 2010; DeWall et al., 2011); in this case, an enlarged
P3 would be expected. We predicted that self-affirmation would
lead to an enlarged P3 during the evaluation of an offer, regardless
of its fairness level. We also examined the FRN amplitude. Since
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic depiction of a single trial setting. In this exemplar trial, the responder accepts the offer proposed by another player, thus the money is
split between the two as proposed. Note that in the original task, all the verbal information presented was written in Chinese.
self-affirmation affects UG behavior by modulating the amount
of psychological resources rather than fairness perception, we
predicted that self-affirmation would not produce any discernible
difference in the FRN.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
We recruited 40 Chinese college students online to participate
in the experiment. These students came from Beijing-based
universities located near the Institute of Psychology, Chinese
Academy of Sciences, such as Beijing Forestry University
and China Agricultural University. One student declined our
invitation. Another student bowed out of the experiment
because of health issues. As a result, the final sample
consisted of 38 participants in total, who were randomly
assigned to the familial self-affirmation condition and the
control condition, such that both groups were composed of
19 participants (affirmation condition: 13 females; control
condition: 8 females). An independent-sample t-test revealed that
the participants in the two conditions did not differ significantly
in age (affirmation condition: 22.89 years, control condition:
24.37 years; t(36)= 1.76, p= 0.087).
All participants reported that they were free of regular use
of any substance that might influence the central nervous
system; none had a history of neurological disease. All had
normal vision (with correction) and were right-handed. Also,
all participants submitted their written informed consent prior
to the experiment. The Institutional Review Board (IRB) in the
Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences approved
the experimental protocol.
Procedure
The self-affirmation procedure was derived from Cai et al. (2013).
In the self-affirmation condition, participants chose one value
that they and their family cherished most from four domains
(financial wealth, social network, art/creativity, and knowledge).
Then they were asked to record their explanation about why
their chosen value was important to them and their family (no
less than 150 words). Finally, they were required to describe an
experience in which they realized how important this value was
to them and their family (no less than 150 words). In the control
condition, participants chose a value that was least important to
them, recorded why this value might be important to ordinary
students, and described an experience in which they realized that
this value was important to ordinary students1.
Immediately afterward, participants in both conditions were
informed of the UG rules, of which the design replicated that
of Luo et al. (2014). Participants were told that the affirmation
manipulation and the UG task belonged to different research
projects for different purposes. To reinforce the social nature
of the task, participants were told that they would play the
UG together with three other anonymous college students. In
actuality, no one else was playing the game, and participants
received no further information about the identities of the
supposed players. Participants were also told that they would
be assigned to different roles (proposer or responder) to be
determined by drawing lots prior to the task. In reality, all
participants received instruction to play responder.
In the formal task, participant sat comfortably approximately
100 cm in front of a computer screen. Stimulus display and
behavioral data acquisition were conducted using E-Prime 2.0
(Psychology Software Tools, Inc.). Each trial began with the
presentation of a central fixation cross for 1.5–2 s (randomized
across trials). Thereafter, either a person posing as a player or
the computer proposed an offer (8.5◦ × 1.5◦) for an interim of
2 s to split 10 Chinese Yuan (∼1.5 US dollars) with participants.
As responders, participants decided whether or not to accept
the offer by pressing the F or J buttons on the keyboard with
their left or right index fingers (the button assignments were
counterbalanced across participants). After participants made
their decisions, they waited for 0.8–1.2 s to receive feedback,
which informed them of the results of the current trial (Figure 1).
Before the task, participants were informed that their
compensation for the experiment would be 20 Chinese Yuan
plus the cumulative outcome of the UG. The higher the score a
participant earned, the higher the payment they would receive
at the end of the experiment. Participants were also told that
they would finish the task with three other anonymous college
students; that the offer in each trial was selected randomly
1In the affirmation condition, financial wealth, social network, and knowledge
were chosen by six participants as the most important value, respectively; one
participants chose art/creativity. In the control condition, 16 participants chose
art/creativity as the least important value, two chose financial wealth, and one chose
social network.
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from the other three players; that they would be unable to
identify which proposer suggested the offer in a given trial; and
that the proposers would not know whether the participants
accepted or rejected their offers (Boksem and De Cremer, 2010).
Unbeknownst to the participants, all offers were actually assigned
by the computer in predetermined pseudorandom sequences.
The task contained three blocks in total, each of which consisted
of 50 trials, with each block separated by a short interval. Each
block included 20 equitable trials (10 offers of 50:50 and 10 of
40:60), 20 inequitable trials (10 offers of 10:90 and 10 of 20:80),
and 10 moderate inequitable offers (30:70). After participants
finished the task, they were debriefed and remunerated with 100
Chinese Yuan regardless of their performance. According to their
self-report, all the participants believed that they were interacting
with human proposers during the task.
Electrophysiological Recording and
Preprocessing
An electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from 64 scalp
sites using tin electrodes mounted in an elastic cap (NeuroScan
Inc.) with an online reference to the left mastoid and off-
line algebraic re-reference to the average of the left and right
mastoids. In addition, an electrooculogram (EOG) was recorded
for the purpose of artifact correction. Horizontal EOG was
recorded from electrodes placed at the outer canthi of both
eyes and Vertical EOG from electrodes placed above and below
the left eye. All inter-electrode impedance was maintained
at <5 k. EEG and EOG signals were amplified with a
0.05–100 Hz online band-pass filter and continuously sampled at
500 Hz/channel.
During the off-line analysis, ocular artifacts were removed
from the EEG signal using a regression procedure implemented
with Neuroscan software (Semlitsch et al., 1986). After
0.05–30 Hz band-pass digital filtering through a zero phase
shift, the EEG data were segmented into epochs time-locked
to the onset of the offer presentation. Separate EEG epochs
of 1000 ms were baseline-corrected by subtracting from each
sample the average activity of that channel during the−200–0 ms
baseline period. Any trial in which EEG voltages exceeded a
threshold of ± 100 µV during the recording epoch was excluded
from further analysis. After the data preprocessing described
above, the trials survived were determined as artifact-free
(fair condition: 94.4 ± 2.5% of the 60 trials; unfair condition:
94.1± 2.5% of the 60 trials).
Data Analysis
The rejection rates for fair (i.e., 40:60 and 50:50) and unfair
(i.e., 10:90 and 20:80) offers were calculated, respectively (Hewig
et al., 2011; Harle and Sanfey, 2012). Consistent with our previous
studies (T. Wu et al., 2013; Luo et al., 2014), moderate unfair
offers (30:70) were excluded from data analysis, because UG
players often disagree on whether such offers should be regarded
as fair or not (Halko et al., 2009). Therefore, it is difficult to
categorize this kind of offer. In addition, excluding moderate
unfair offer also makes the data analysis more parsimonious.
Previous literature suggests two ways to calculate the FRN
amplitude, that is, either using grand-averaged ERPs or creating
a difference wave between “error” and “correct” trials (Holroyd
et al., 2008; Wu and Zhou, 2009). We measured the grand-
averaged waveforms in this study because the difference wave
approach is unsuited for exploring whether self-priming affected
neural response in the unfair condition, the fair condition, or
both (see also Luo et al., 2014). The amplitudes of the FRN
and P3 were calculated as the mean values within the 250–350
and 400–600 ms time windows following the presentation of the
UG offer, respectively. The time windows were selected through
visual inspection of grand-averaged waveforms. The electrodes in
which the ERP components reached their maximum were chosen
for further analysis (see the “ERP Results” subsection).
Rejection rates, FRN amplitudes, and P3 amplitudes were
analyzed using two-way Fairness (fair vs. unfair) × Self-
affirmation (self-affirmation condition vs. control condition)
ANOVA tests, with Self-affirmation as the between-subject factor.
For all the analyses, the significance level was set at 0.05.
Significant effects were analyzed using simple-effect models (LSD,
two-tailed). Partial eta-squared (η2p) values were reported to
examine the size of effects in ANOVA models.
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
The main effect of the Fairness was significant, F(1,36) = 161.33,
p< 0.001, η2p= 0.82; the rejection rate was higher for unfair offers
than fair offers (71.8 ± 5.1% vs. 6.4 ± 2.9%). The main effect
of Self-affirmation was marginally significant, F(1,36) = 3.97,
p = 0.054, η2p = 0.10; the rejection rate showed a tendency to
be higher in the self-affirmation condition than in the control
condition (45.5 ± 4.6% vs. 32.7 ± 4.6%). This effect was
qualified by Fairness as indicated by a significant Fairness× Self-
affirmation interaction (Figure 2), F(1,36) = 6.30, p = 0.017,
η2p = 0.15; participants in the self-affirmation condition were
more likely to reject unfair offers than in the control condition
(84.7% vs. 58.9%; p = 0.015), while no significant difference was
FIGURE 2 | Rejection rate of offers. Error bars indicate 1 SE.
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found for fair offers (6.3% vs. 6.4%; p = 0.988). Our hypothesis
on behavioral data was confirmed.
ERP Results
The FRN
According to visual detection on the scalp topographies, the
FRN was determined to be maximal in the fronto-central area
(Figure 3). Accordingly, the arithmetic means of three electrodes
in this area (Fz, FCz, Cz) were calculated for further analysis.
Neither the main effect of Fairness, F(1,36) = 0.05, p = 0.82,
η2p < 0.01, nor the main effect of Self-affirmation, F(1,36)= 0.24,
p = 0.63, η2p = 0.01, nor the Fairness × Self-affirmation
interaction, F(1,36) = 0.80, p = 0.38, η2p = 0.02, was significant
(Figure 3).
The P3
According to visual detection on the scalp topographies, the
P3 was determined to be maximal in the centro-parietal area
(Figure 4). Accordingly, the arithmetic means of three electrodes
in this area (Cz, CPz, Pz) were calculated for further analysis. The
main effect of Fairness was significant, F(1,36)= 10.56, p= 0.003,
η2p = 0.23; unfair offers elicited a larger P3 than fair offers
(5.02 µV vs. 3.70 µV). Most interesting, the main effect of Self-
affirmation was significant, F(1,36) = 4.79, p = 0.035, η2p = 0.12;
the P3 was larger in the self-affirmation condition than in the
control condition (5.41 µV vs. 3.32 µV; see Figure 4), which
held true under both the fair and unfair conditions as indicated
by the non-significant Fairness × Self-affirmation interaction,
F(1,36) = 0.01, p = 0.91, η2p < 0.01. Our hypothesis on the P3
was confirmed.
DISCUSSION
We conducted an ERP study to examine the influence of self-
affirmation on social decision-making in the UG context. Insofar
as we know, this is the first study to examine the impacts
of self-affirmation on social decision-making. Consistent with
previous findings, participants were more likely to reject unfair
offers than fair offers (Thaler, 1988; Güth and Tietz, 1990;
Nowak et al., 2000). Most importantly, self-affirmation influences
both behavioral and brain responses. At the behavioral level,
we found that when the offer was fair, the rejection rate in
the self-affirmation condition did not differ significantly from
the control condition; however, when the offer was unfair, the
rejection rate in the self-affirmation condition was higher than
that in the control condition. At the neural level, we found that
the P3 amplitude was significantly larger in the self-affirmation
FIGURE 3 | Grand-average event-related potentials (ERPs) evoked by offer presentation at the Fz recording site, where the feedback-related
negativity (FRN) was measured. The time point 0 indicates the onset of offer presentation. The shaded gray areas indicate the 250–350 ms time window for the
calculation of the mean value of the FRN. The scalp topographies of each condition are presented beneath.
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FIGURE 4 | Grand-average ERPs evoked by offer presentation at the Pz recording site, where the P3 component was measured. The time point 0
indicates the onset of offer presentation. The shaded gray areas indicate the 400–600 ms time window for the calculation of the mean value of the P3. The scalp
topographies of each condition are presented beneath.
condition than in the control condition regardless of the fairness
of the offer.
Our findings shed light on the understanding of a prevalent
phenomenon in social decision-making: people tend to reject an
offer in UG, even at the price of an economic loss. The dominant
fairness account suggests that when an offer is perceived to be
unfair, people tend to reject it at the expense of certain personal
benefits in order to maintain a fair world. Given that rejecting an
offer may incur not only economic but also psychological costs
(Baumeister and Leary, 1995; Zhang et al., 2009), we propose
that whether a person has enough psychological resources to
cope with the negative influences of rejecting others also plays a
role in his/her social decision-making. If a person’s psychological
resources and concomitant tolerance of the consequences of
rejection are temporarily strengthened, he/she will be more likely
to reject an unfair offer. We capitalize on self-affirmation, a self-
regulation strategy that may help people to draw psychological
resources to cope with stressful situations. Results based on the
neural index P3 indicate that self-affirmation boosts participants’
psychological resources momentarily. Additionally, results based
on behavioral responses indicate that affirmed participants are
more likely to reject unfair offers than control participants. To
sum up, the findings indicate that self-affirmation enables more
psychological resources available and increase rejection of unfair
offers accordingly. However, it is worth noting that we have used
a neural measure for psychological resource because behavioral
measure is not available so far.
We have capitalized on self-affirmation as a way to boost
psychological resources so that people are more likely to reject
an unfair offer. The current results support this proposal and
are also consistent with a past finding that self-affirmation
offsets depletion of psychological resources (Schmeichel and
Vohs, 2009). Given that many mediators have been proposed to
explain self-affirmation effects and many consequences of self-
affirmation have been identified (Sherman and Cohen, 2006),
people may suggest that the influence of self-affirmation on
UG performance manifested via other mechanisms rather than
boosting psychological resources. For example, self-affirmation
may function by boosting state self-esteem, promoting positive
affects, enhancing a transcendental perspective, or reducing
cognitive dissonance (Sherman and Cohen, 2006; Cohen and
Sherman, 2014). However, we would like to point out that
these theories are not conflicting with the psychological resource
account because essentially they are all manifestations or
consequences of increased psychological resources (Tesser, 2000;
Sherman and Cohen, 2006; Cohen and Sherman, 2014). Hence
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it is not surprising that they may also explain our findings
to some extent. For instance, the broadened view may make
people less concern about the negative effect of rejecting the
proposer. However, it would be difficult for this theory to
explain why the P3 component was enlarged rather than
decrease. In contrast, the psychological resource account provides
a more direct and parsimonious interpretation for the ERP
findings.
An alternative interpretation is that self-affirmation affected
subjective fairness perception of UG proposals, which further
resulted in a higher rejection rate of unfair offers among affirmed
people. In this case, it would be difficult to explain why the
FRN amplitude, an index of fairness judgment (Boksem and De
Cremer, 2010; Van der Veen and Sahibdin, 2011; Alexopoulos
et al., 2012; Luo et al., 2014), was insensitive to self-affirmation.
Another alternative interpretation is that self-affirmation made
people blind to the proposer’s feelings. Recent fMRI studies,
however, have found that self-affirmation produces heightened
activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC; Falk et al.,
2015; Cascio et al., 2016), which is a brain area crucial for
empathy (Botvinick et al., 2005). These findings suggest that
affirmed participants might know better about how the proposers
felt than unaffirmed participants. Even so, they still chose to
reject the offers. Future studies may include a measure to assess
how people perceived proposer’s feelings and test this possibility
directly.
Our finding that affirmed people are more likely to reject
an unfair offer may help understand some past findings in a
novel perspective. For instance, Campanha et al. (2011) identified
an attenuation of altruistic punishment (i.e., punishing unfair
offers) among participants when playing UG with a friend over
playing with a stranger. The classic fairness account suggests that
friendship may have lessened the perceived unfairness of the offer
and resulted in fewer rejections of an unfair offer (Campanha
et al., 2011). We suggest another possibility: participants may
choose not to reject an unfair offer due to concerns about
the damage to their friendship with the proposer (see also
Campanha et al., 2011). Inversely put, if participants had enough
psychological resources such that they did not care about the
negative consequences of rejection, they may not have refrained
from rejecting the offer. Future studies could directly examine the
possibility that self-affirmation enables people to say “no” to an
unfair proposal from a friend.
Our study also contributes to the literature on self-affirmation
in several ways. First, previous research has demonstrated the
influences of self-affirmation on various psychological processes
(for reviews, Sherman and Cohen, 2006; Cohen and Sherman,
2014). For the first time, we find out that self-affirmation may
also impact social decision-making by increasing the possibility
of rejecting an unfair offer, thus extending the understanding
of the functions of self-affirmation. Second, our study also
sheds light on the neural mechanism underlying self-affirmation.
Burgeoning research has started to investigate the influence of
self-affirmation on brain responses. A first ERP study showed
that self-affirmation enlarges the error-related negativity (ERN)
component, the amplitude of which further predicts performance
errors, suggesting that self-affirmation increases the openness
to mistakes via enhanced error-monitoring (Legault et al.,
2012). A recent fMRI study indicated that self-affirmation
increases the neural activity of vmPFC in response to health
risk information, which in turn predicts declines in sedentary
behavior (Falk et al., 2015). These findings suggest that
self-affirmation reduces defensiveness by viewing otherwise
threatening information as self-relevant. Latest brain-imaging
studies have also demonstrated that self-affirmation heightens
the activity of the ventral striatum, suggesting that self-
affirmation may be adaptive due to its rewarding function
(Cascio et al., 2016; Dutcher et al., 2016). Adding to this wealth
of findings, the current study indicates that self-affirmation
increases psychological resources as reflected by the enlarged P3
during social evaluation. Taken together, these studies illustrate
the neural underpinnings of self-affirmation from multiple
perspectives (Steele, 1988; Sherman and Cohen, 2006; Cohen and
Sherman, 2014).
The FRN represents an early encoding of the monetary
outcome of the offer, which is supposed to be automatic and
independent of psychological resources (D. Zhang et al., 2014;
Yang et al., 2015). Consistent with our hypothesis, the FRN
was not sensitive to self-affirmation. Unexpectedly, the FRN
did not vary with the fairness level of the UG offer. Given
that past research has consistently shown that unfair offers
elicit a larger FRN than fair offers (Boksem and De Cremer,
2010; Luo et al., 2014), it is inappropriate for us to make any
particular speculations before ensuring that this unusual finding
is replicable. Although the insensitivity of FRN to self-affirmation
may suggest that self-affirmation does not affect the rejection to
unfair offers by influencing fairness perception, its insensitivity to
high versus low fairness dampens this speculation. Thus, future
replications are needed.
In summary, this study suggests that self-affirmation
augments psychological resources in social decision-making and
further increase the rejection of an unfair offer. Our findings,
however, are preliminary due to several reasons. First, people
may expect that the change in the P3 could mediate the influence
of self-affirmation on the behavioral rejection rate of unfair
offers. Actually, we have examined this possibility but failed
to find any significant mediating effect (not included in the
manuscript). Second, we have hypothesized that the concerns
about interpersonal relationship play an important role in social
decision-making. However, we did not include any measure (e.g.,
sensitivity to reject others) to verify this possibility. Future study
may include relevant measures and test this hypothesis directly.
Third, although the sample size in our study is comparable to
similar ERP studies (e.g., Legault et al., 2012; Luo et al., 2014),
it is relatively small compared to typical behavioral studies on
self-affirmation (e.g., Schmeichel and Martens, 2005; Schmeichel
and Vohs, 2009). Future study may use larger sample. Fourth, we
have conducted our study in China, a representative collectivistic
culture, where interpersonal harmony is highly valued and the
interpersonal harmfulness in rejecting an offer poses a real
concern (Markus and Kitayama, 1991). We do not know if
our findings would also hold true beyond China. Finally, we
have only examined one paradigm of social decision-making
and do not know if the findings would also apply to other
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 November 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1824
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paradigms, such as the prisoner’s dilemma. Future replications in
different cultures and with different paradigms are needed.
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